

AIR WAR COLLEGE DIRECTORATE OF NONRESIDENT STUDIES  
AIR UNIVERSITY

8<sup>th</sup> Edition /

AN ANALYSIS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN  
COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE IN EUROPE  
DURING WORLD WAR II, 1942-1945 ✓

by

~~Gregory P. Holger~~  
Lt Col. USAFR

Circuit Judge  
Hillsborough County Courthouse  
419 Pierce St , Rm. 370  
Tampa, FL 33602

Seminar No. 059B /

A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE VOLUME 1


WRITING ASSIGNMENT

January 1998 /



## CERTIFICATE

I have read and understand the Academic Integrity Section of the Program Guide. I certify that I have not used another student's research work and that the creative process of researching, organizing, and writing this research report represents only my own work. I have read the instructions regarding purpose, scope, format and content of this effort and have accomplished the research paper in accordance with the appropriate Research Report Review Checklist.

  
Gregory P. Holder, Lt Col. USAFR

## DISCLAIMER

This research report represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force instruction 51-203, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States Government and is not to be reproduced in whole or part without permission of the Commandant, Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION	PAGE
CERTIFICATE AND DISCLAIMER	ii
I INTRODUCTION	1
II CONFLICT AND CAMPAIGN BACKGROUND	2
III STRATEGY ANALYSIS	3
What is it all about?	3
Is the National Military Strategy Tailored to Meet the National Political Objective?	3
What are the Limits of Military Power?	3
What are the Alternatives?	7
How Strong is the Homefront?	8
Does Today's Strategy Overlook Points of Difference and Exaggerate Points of Likeness Between Past and Present?	9
IV AIR CAMPAIGN EXECUTION	10
Air Campaign Plan	10
Air Campaign Phases and Dates	10
Forces and Targets	11
Results	11
V AIR CAMPAIGN EVALUATION	13
Objective	13
Offensive	13
Mass	13
Maneuver	13
Security	16
Surprise	17
Unity of Command	17
Economy of Force	18
Simplicity	18
VI SUMMARY AND STRATEGIC/DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS	19
Summary	19
Doctrinal Implications	20
BIBLIOGRAPHY	22

## SECTION I

### INTRODUCTION

The Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive (hereinafter referred to as "CBO") during World War II was selected as a *1/2 of the* strategy of massive and systematic bombing of German war related factories and cities in order to destroy the German military, industrial and economic system and to undermine the morale of the German people "to a point where their capacity for armed resistance (would be) fatally weakened" (8:133; 9:97; 10:28; 1:20) This paper analyzes the military strategy of the CBO using the six basic questions history suggests that strategist must ask before war (the "Crowl Questions") and then evaluates the air campaign strategy using the "Principles of War" as a framework. *to show why*  
(3:24; 20:123) *Why CBO was successful or failure other half of them*

This framework is useful to analyze the development of a historical military strategy by examining the impact of factors, beginning with the threat confronting a nation, or coalition of nations, on the national interests involved, then how that threat influences the political and military leadership, and in turn, the national policy, in formulating the objective and ultimate strategy. (3:28; 20:123) This analysis will use the framework to show how various factors influenced the development of the strategy of the CBO, why that strategy was used, and the reasons for its successes and its failures. *You never gave any, unlike 1st paragraph which describes why it was selected.*

*HALF A THESIS. ALSO MISSING SCOPE OF PAPER A SECTION BY SECTION ACCOUNT*

## SECTION II

### CONFLICT AND CAMPAIGN BACKGROUND

World War II began September 1, 1939, when Germany invaded Poland, and ended September 2, 1945, with the signing of peace accords aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The genesis of the conflict centered on the ethnocentric policy concepts formulated by Adolph Hitler when he became Chancellor of Germany in 1933 (14:26; 15:566-574).

In the years preceding the war, Hitler's racist ideology and his doctrine of acquiring space (land) to support what he viewed as the superior race focused the attention of Germany primarily on Poland, Russia, Austria and France. Germany's world trade and naval ambitions also posed a direct threat to Great Britain.

(14:27-31) An admirer of Mussolini's fascist agenda, Hitler formed an alliance with Italy, with an eye toward aiding Italy in its expansionist program and gaining Italian support in the German annexation of Austria and the conquering of other European states. (15:579) Within two years after its invasion of Poland, Germany was at full-scale war against the Allied powers,

including Russia, France and England.

*Also Reaction to terms of Versailles Treaty*  
*Who? Where? When? You haven't even mentioned this Axis power?*  
After the direct attack by the Axis, the United States entered the war in support of the Allied coalition of powers. It is fair to say that overall military doctrine of the Allied powers in World War II was based in significant part, if not wholly, upon the policy announced by President Roosevelt that the

Allies would insist upon unconditional surrender from the Axis powers. This reportedly was an unpremeditated comment made at a press conference; a remark which some have criticized as being careless and politically motivated, and one which initiated a policy liable to prolong the war (12:151; see also 6:9)

Regardless of one's view as to whether the President's comment was careless or policy well thought out, it became the overriding Allied aim. (6:4)

Since the American national interest required the survival of Great Britain as a great power, one of the key strategic decisions of the United States <sup>ALSO!</sup> was that initial efforts toward Japan would be limited to containment and harassment until Germany was defeated. (6:3, 5) Limitations of space prevent a detailed discussion here of the overall air, ground and maritime strategy of the entire war, but it is sufficient for the purposes of the analysis to note that:

The Allied offensive in Europe was to include economic pressure through blockade, a sustained air offensive against German military power, early defeat of Italy, and the buildup of forces for an eventual land offensive against Germany. As rapidly as possible, the Allies were to achieve "superiority of air strength over that of the enemy, particularly in long-range striking forces." (5:205; quotes in original)

(205)

Achieving long-range striking air superiority over Germany was to be accomplished primarily through strategic bombing, a (then) new technique of warfare defined by General Carl Spaatz, one of the leading air commanders in World War II and first Chief of Staff of the autonomous United States Air Force, as, "an

independent air campaign, intended to be decisive, and directed against the essential war-making capacity of the enemy." (15:20)

In Europe that air campaign was carried out through the CBO, a product of a directive issued as the result of the conference held in <sup>SAN</sup> 1943 in Casablanca. At this conference, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the American and British armed services announced that they had, in essence, established a formula for ending the war. (12:151)

Whether the CBO itself was 'decisive' is to this day the subject of some disagreement, but in fact, the effort was frustrated to one degree or another by various factors, including, among others, delays in obtaining adequate long-range escort fighter support, decisions by political and top level military leaders to invade North Africa to ensure control of the Mediterranean, differing interpretations of the Casablanca Directive, and differences between the United States and British airmen as to targeting and methods of bombing. (6:13, 24, 32, 86; 8:136, 139; see also, 18:H12)

YOU NEED MORE BACKGROUND ON  
MILITARY LEADERSHIP DURING THIS TIME  
AND HOW DOCTRINE WAS IMPACTED IN  
YEARS OF WAR PRIOR TO 1943 -- THIS  
WOULD HAVE A BIG IMPACT ON DOCTRINE  
ESPECIALLY FOR RAF. MANY SPECIFICS  
MISSING I.E. BECAVA CONF, RAF DAY BOMBING  
EXPERIENCE 1942, EAKER, HARRIS, AWPB-1, AWPB-

### SECTION III

#### STRATEGY ANALYSIS - IS OF CBO NOT WWII!

##### What is it about?

In addition to ensuring the survival of Great Britain (6:1), clearly the American national interest in preventing Axis influence, if not expansion, in the Western Hemisphere was a prime factor which shaped national policy and the objective of the war. The interest was truly national in scope, held by virtually every American man, woman and child. As expressed by one who was a child during the war: "In our vivid expectation, losing World War II would mean being occupied. Even if we were not taken over, we had an only somewhat less horrendous anxiety that we would be bombed. The more accurate fear of losing the war itself... was supplanted as a personal preoccupation by a kind of monomaniacal focus on the war and the drive to win it" (7:55)

##### Is the National Military Strategy Tailored to Meet the National Political Objectives?

After considering the national interests and policy objectives that would be served by military action, the Casablanca Directive appeared to be straightforward: "[The] progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened" (9:252) The intent of the Casablanca Directive was not so obviously expressed, however, as

WHY CBO? ① 2nd FRONT  
TO RELIEVE  
PRESSURE ON  
RUSSAINS AND  
KEEP THEM IN  
WAR  
② PREP FOR  
LAND  
INVASION  
③ DO  
SOMETHING  
FOR BRITISH  
PERSONS  
UNDE  
READY  
TO  
INVASION

WAS THIS  
AMENDED?  
WHY?  
TO SAY  
WHAT?  
SIGNIFICANCE



evidenced by the fact that by the time the Directive was adopted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on May 18, 1943, a sentence had *Ah, (Geeh)!* been added, apparently to clarify what was meant by "fatally weakened": "This is construed as meaning so weakened as to permit initiation of final combined operations on the Continent." (9:257)

In an attempt to clarify "fatally weakened," the added sentence created more interpretations and raised further doubts as to the basic strategic purpose of the CBO (9:257) However, the American strategy and supporting operations focused on those aspects of the Directive that targeted "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system as a path to the fatal weakening" through the use of selective daytime precision bombing. (9:257) The CBO was executed to achieve the overriding goal of the total defeat of the enemy through the use of both daytime and nighttime bombing--round the clock (6:10; 19:121)

*SIGNIFICANCE?  
GOTS BACK TO  
PREWAR BEST  
YOU FIGHT  
DEV. IN  
SECTION*

*WAS THIS BY DESIGN OR RESULT OF  
COMPROMISE?*

#### What are the Limits of Military Power?

The Americans initially supported the CBO for political reasons. President Roosevelt felt that American isolationism would be overcome through the low casualties and relatively low costs offered by the bomber alternative. (14:102-105) However, the full impact of the Allied resources was depleted, or at least delayed, by the diversion into North Africa in late 1942 which committed many heavy bombers intended for use in Europe. (9:271;

*THIS IS  
HISTORICAL  
BACKGROUND  
INFO NOT  
CBO WHICH  
IS TOPIC OF  
THIS SECTION*

12:103) Aside from these diversions, the Americans suffered unacceptable heavy losses during unescorted daylight bombing runs, despite changes in combat tactics (10:231). This problem was eventually remedied by the deployment of the P-51 ("Mustang"), but it was March 1944 before there were sufficient Mustangs available to begin escorting large daylight raids into the heart of Germany (10:231).

REMEMBER IT  
IS PRE-CE  
CE CAMPAIGN  
SELECTION  
THIS WASN  
KNOWN AT  
THE TIME  
OF JAN 43

Additionally, the strategic air forces were frustrated by the requirement to divert efforts to targets not considered vital to the German war economy, such as German submarine bases along the French coast (14:126; 10:231; 13:153). Taking the resources of the Allies in mind, the resources of Germany were targeted according to a set of established priority targets (9:251). The goal was to arrest the German strengths with carefully planned strategies utilizing the combined forces and resources of the Allied forces.

WHAT UNIT  
DOES COB  
I.E. MORE  
THERE  
ENOUGH  
PLANES +  
CREW TO  
CANNOT  
SOMEBODY  
RIGHT  
WAY  
WHY AT  
POWER,  
WHY A  
A B-H  
RIGHT  
AWAY

#### What are the Alternatives?

What if the goal to arrest the German strengths according to the prescribed plans failed? Although there were operation plans, staff studies, war game scenarios and solutions, these were all based upon conjecture and speculation (3:27). Blueprints were drawn up stipulating in detail the location, movement, and preferred courses of action for vast numbers of men, ships, planes, tanks, guns, and supplies. (3:27) Nevertheless, the superior strategist must above all else be flexible (3:27). The

CBO was executed principally in three phases during 1943 and 1944 (8:146) Until adequate escort fighter protection for long range bombing runs were provided, there were unacceptable losses. Although the CBO inflicted immense damage to most of the places attacked, the German war economy was relatively unaffected. (8:123; 8:146) Further, although the weight of bombs dropped on Germany in 1943 was five times more than the year before, German armaments production actually increased by 50 per cent. (8:153)

WHAT ABOUT 1945?

COULD ALLIES HAVE WAITED TILL LENDY FOR D-DAY? WHY NOT? DEBATE!

Such facts do not necessarily suggest the CBO was a failure. Allied strategic bombing diverted an enormous amount of German manpower and material which otherwise could have been used on the Eastern and Western fronts. (8:153) In so doing, as stated by Major General Hansell, at the very least the CBO provided the sine qua non for the invasion of Europe. (9:116)

POINT EARLIER!

WHY WAS THIS NECESSARY? EXPLAIN.

#### How Strong is the Home front?

The societal values and national resources of each ally in a coalition of powers provide input to the political leadership developing the policy which governs the military and determines the objective. For both the war in general and the CBO campaign,

the key societal values of the various Allied powers were sufficiently similar that they may be fairly considered to be shared. Those societal values had a direct influence on the national resources available to conduct the war and the CBO campaign. Civilian life in World War II was "one unbroken stretch of national resolve and sacrifice" which created what has

MEANING WHAT? DEFEAT OF GERMANY? DID BRITS + AMERICANS FEEL THE SAME

WAY ABOUT BOMBING GERMAN CITIES? WHY?

IMPACT ON DOMESTIC? CBO

been described as "an unmatched economic and technological colossus." (11:H6: <sup>H4</sup> see also 7:114) As one observer noted: "By <sup>THIS ISN'T TALK FOR THIS SECTION</sup> war's end, U S plants were turning out 60,000 warplanes and a thousand cargo ships a year. In all, the U.S. war effort produced 296,601 aircraft, 71,060 ships, 86,388 tanks. This miracle of production, as much as manpower using the weapons coming off the lines, won the war" (11:H7) Although the numbers may differ, the societal values of English citizens had a similar impact on British national resources available for the war <sup>BUT DIFFERENT! WHY? DEVELOP!</sup> overall and the CSO campaign. Undoubtedly those "inputs" led the American and British political leadership to develop the resolute policy for the total defeat of their enemies <sup>SMILE!</sup> <sup>BUT IN DIFFERENT WAYS WHY?</sup>

Does Today's Strategy Overlook Points of Difference and Exaggerate Points of Likeness Between Past and Present?

Theories of air power were under constant development after World War I. No power "ignored, or could afford to ignore, the advent of air power." (14:18; 16:20-25) The Axis threat impacted military leadership thinking on force structure, technology and doctrine. American doctrine adopted the untested principles underlying the mass-bombing strategies of Mitchell and Douhet-- "that in modern total war, civilians and armed forces were inseparably linked in national war machines." (16:35) <sup>AND</sup>

YOU USE 6 CROWL QUESTIONS BUT YOUR FOCUS IS OFF FOR THIS SECTION AS NOTED.

USUL-CROWL'S QUESTIONS TO ANALYZE

IT IS JAN 43 WHY DID ALL NOT TO GO WITH CSO? THAT YOU BE FOCUS OF THIS SECTION

SO WHAT DID AIR POWERS LEADERS SAY?

## SECTION IV

### AIR CAMPAIGN EXECUTION

#### Air Campaign Plan

World War II was the first extensive use of air power on both the tactical and strategic level (2: 214) The CBO Plan concluded that "the destruction and continued neutralization of some sixty (60) targets would gravely impair and might paralyze the western Axis war effort" (9: 255) From the original potential target list, six systems, comprising seventy-six precision targets, were selected. They included as principal objectives the following facilities: German aircraft industry; submarine construction yards and bases; ball bearings; oil, synthetic rubber and tires; and, military transport vehicles (9: 255)

WAS THERE  
AN  
INTERMEDIATE  
TARGET?  
WHY?  
EXPLAIN

#### Air Campaign Phases and Dates

The strategic air war in Europe has been described as having <sup>LOWELL 1517?</sup> three or four phases: first, during 1942 as the U.S. attempted to organize its air effort; second, during 1943 and the first half of 1944, establishing allied air superiority and paving the way for a successful cross-Channel invasion (800 U.S. heavy bombers on hand by July, 1192 by October and 1746 on hand by January 1944); and finally, <sup>ie. 1945 POWERS</sup> after June 1944, as a purely strategic air campaign in support of the Allied invasion (2702 U.S. heavy bombers on hand) (9:255; 10:228) These last two phases of the strategic air war in Europe began to combine the

activities of the United States and England in a coordinated effort to destroy the German military, industrial, and economic system as well to fatally weaken and undermine German morale and resistance. *Goult?*

### Forces and Targets

The primary forces used in the CBO were the RAF Bomber Command flying the Lancaster, the B-24 "Liberator," and B17 "Flying Fortress" of the American Eighth Air Force. Consistent with their air warfare philosophy, the British had developed the large Lancaster for heavy night bombing, while the American bombers were designed and built for precision daytime bombing. *WAS THIS RAF POSITION PRE-TRAINED? WHY CHANGE? You're yet to develop WAY THE DIFFERENCE*

(15; 121)

In January 1943, the Army Air Forces had only 12 heavy bombardment groups and the maximum strength of 62 heavy bomber groups was attained in May 1944. The total of first-line B-17s and B-24s deployed against Germany increased from 413 in January 1943 to a maximum of 5,072 in March 1945. (5:77) The RAF Bomber Command strength increased from 515 light, medium, and heavy bombers in January 1943 to a total of 1,069 in April 1945. (5:77)

The first raid of the CBO took place on August 17, 1942 with 12 B-17s attacking the French city of Rouen dropping 18.5 tons of bombs. This was followed two days later with an attack on Abbeville. (1: 63-64) By early October 1942, American forces had flown 13 missions against German targets in France, Belgium and Holland. On October 9, 1942, American forces launched 108 *How could this be? CASABLANCA wasn't even until JAN 43*

*THIS IS ALL BACKGROUND INFO SECTION II*

bombers including B-17s and B-24s against Lillie. Although the Allied invasion of North Africa cost the CBO nearly 100 planes, attacks continued that fell on submarine facilities. However, by the end of 1942, the daylight offensive had flown only 27 missions with not one bomb dropped on German soil (1:55-56) *ditto this!*

Subsequent to the Casablanca Directive, on January 27, and again on February 26, 1943, Allied bombers attacked the German city of Wilhelmshaven. Not to be outdone, on March 5, 1943, 367 RAF planes attacked Essen and on March 18, 1943, 97 American bombers attacked Vegesack in northwestern Germany marking according to General Baker, "a new chapter" in daytime, high-level precision bombing. (1:50) In late June, Allied Forces launched Mission No. 69 attacking the U-boat pens at Saint-Nazaire with 181 bombers and using 50 bombers to attack a German airfield near Brussels *Source? Common Knowledge? Your own idea? Then cite!*

In July, Allied Forces began around the clock bombing of Hamburg with 740 RAF bombers beginning the attack followed by 68 B-17s and then 722 RAF bombers on the next wave. These actions were repeated days later and the American forces attacked the German naval base at Trondheim as a diversion. Pressing on preparing for the Allied invasion of Europe, in August 1943, three massive U.S. raids took place on Floesti (oil refineries), Regensburg (Messerschmitt plant), and Schweinfurt (ball bearings). On August 17, 1943, RAF bombers attacked the city of Peenemunde followed five days later with an attack on Berlin itself. *Week Dev. How this came about? Success/Fail what? Results? Impacts? Develop!*

The Americans waited until October 14 to again attack Schweinfurt with 293 B-17s and again suffered severe losses. After this, General Baker halted American raids deep into Germany while the RAF continued its night bombing attacks. On November 15, 1943, the British launched the campaign known as the Battle of Britain lasting four and one-half months including 35 major raids using an average of more than 500 bombers per mission. Nineteen of the raids were directed against German cities with 16 missions against Berlin itself (1: 135-137).

#### Results

As Major General Orvil Anderson stated: "If you will only let experience be your teacher, you can have any damn lesson you want." (5:75) An analysis of the Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive in Europe during World War II clearly shows that force structure, air war doctrine and technology all affected the timing and ability to attain the objective of the CBO.

Ultimately, the object of the CBO was to accomplish as much destruction of the enemy as cheaply as possible. With this objective comes the realization that this goal could only be achieved by combined operations between the Army, Navy, and the Air Forces. (14:203; 5:75) The Allied forces practiced a general air strategy involving the pursuit of all four major aspects of air doctrine simultaneously; air defense, strategic bombing, naval cooperation and air support of ground troops (14:204).

Although the concept of strategic warfare had been advanced



prior to the CBO, the scope of this operation and the general "strict" adherence to its underlying plans resulted in the overwhelming success of allied forces. (9:273)

WHAT WAS BIG-WEEK?

HOW WAS GAF DEFEATED?

HOW DID CBO SUPPORT OPERATION HELLER?

WHAT WAS THE -P-51? IT'S ROLE?

WHEN DID CBO END? WHY?

DID CBO EVER ACHIEVE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES? WHEN?

OBVIOUSLY A LOT LEFT UNDEVELOPED --  
AND NOT MINOR DETAILS EITHER!

MARGINAL SECTION AT BEST!

## SECTION V

### AIR CAMPAIGN EVALUATION

#### Objective

The military strategist uses the principles of war to analyze military actions through the use of an operational framework. (20:123; 21:213-215) The strategic military objective of the CBO was, according to the Directive, the "fatal weakening" of the German military system to allow for the allied invasion of Europe. (9:258) While there was some confusion over the meaning of the Directive, General Arnold welcomed the plan as it allowed him to "fight off the demands of naval and military commanders in other theaters for more and more planes, and get his heavy bombers concentrated in Europe." (6:91) Moreover, strategic bombing allowed Allied Forces to selectively destroy those elements which were most vital to Germany's war potential, and to penetrate deep into Germany to destroy those elements wherever they were located. (19:276)

*EXPLAIN! YOU HAVEN'T YET!*

*WHAT ABOUT  
WITHIN THEATER  
EVEN WITHIN THE  
ALLIED AIR FORCES?*

*BUT YOU NEVER SAY HOW OR HARDLY DID WHAT!*

#### Offensive

*NOT BASED ON YOUR  
"DEVELOPMENT"*

One could reasonably question whether all efforts of the offensive were directed toward a clearly defined common goal given the diversion of resources to tactical targets and the subsequent effect on attainment of the objective. (9:258) The diversion of forces to the Mediterranean resulting from political pressure resulted in only 800 bombers or 66% of the planned English buildup being available. (9:261) Moreover, approximately

three-eighths of the bomb tonnage delivered by U.S. Air Forces in Europe were diverted from the primary targets of the CBO and applied to other targets *Source?* *DID CBO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE?*

#### Mass

*ISN'T STRATEGIC BOMBING BY ITS VERY NATURE OFFENSIVE?*

In the context of overall strategy, the U.S. should have committed the majority of its national power to those regions where the threat to vital security interests is greatest. (20:126) The CBO clearly evidenced *NOT YOUR PARALYZING DEVELOPMENT!* the fact that strategic bombing is the most powerful instrument of war through "its capacity to bring all its forces from widely distributed bases simultaneously to focus on single targets. Such concentration of combat power has never been possible before." (15:276-277)

*WHICH WAS "CRITICAL MASS" ATTAINED, IF EVER? NEVER!*

#### Maneuver

As General Starry stated: "[I]n the strategic sense, this principle has three interrelated dimensions--flexibility, mobility and maneuverability." (20:127) Although strategic bombing has this principle as its basis, the CBO in its greatest sense failed to capitalize on this principle given the delay in the delivery of heavy bombers, the diversion of forces to North Africa and errors with respect to the priority given to various *How so? Explain!* target systems. (6:92; 9:260-264; 17:56)

#### Security

Security enhances flexibility by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise. (20:128) Allied forces suffered heavy losses during the campaign due to technological

MEANING WHAT? SPECIFICS PLEASE!

advances made by the German war machine as evidenced by the heavy losses suffered by American forces at Floesti and Peenemunde. The early warning network developed by the Germans assured the loss of the element of surprise during these operations (1:131-133) Perhaps more importantly, the Germans modified their tactics ultimately halting American bombing within Germany during the Fall of 1943 *Spoke!*

THESE TWO DON'T LIVE! WHICH IS?

#### Surprise

The ability to strike the enemy without observation creates opportunities. The CBO clearly took Germany by surprise given the unprecedented rapid deployment of U.S. combat forces into England. *Spoke!* More importantly, the initial success? enjoyed by the Allied bomber offensive was due in large part to the element of surprise fully utilized by General Eaker. *Spoke!*

#### Unity of Command

"For every objective, there should be unity of effort under one responsible commander" (20:127) In October 1941, General Spaatz had formally proposed that GHQ be eliminated and that overall command be delegated to the Army Chief of Staff. The Air War Plans Division proposed that "coordinate ground, air, and naval services be created, with unity of command to be secured by a common head of all armed services, who would report directly to the President . . ." (3:43) Thus, unity of command could be ensured. This plan was rejected despite General Marshall's belief that "there must be one man in command of the entire

WHAT ABOUT FOR AAF IN EUROPE?

DID IT HAVE UNITY OF COMMAND

HOW?

HAD ALLIED EFFORT HAVE UNITY OF C

*— Did THIS HAPPEN? C.E. Over-  
1st mention*  
theater--air, ground and ships " (S:64) The Arcadia conference ultimately answered the question by establishing the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a composite organization of the British chiefs of staff and their American counterparts *DID THEY EXCLUDE COM DOMINANT CONTROL?*

#### Economy of Force

There is much debate as to whether the CEO defines the principle of Economy of Force due to the diversion of assets previously mentioned. While strategic bombing itself allows the capacity to concentrate on a limited number of vital targets rather than dispersing its force on objectives of secondary importance, the Allies failed to appreciate or follow this principal by diverting forces, delaying forces, and diverting effort to secondary targets. (S: 260; 20:276)

#### Simplicity

In both the strategic and tactical sense, plans should be as simple and direct as the situation will allow. (20:128) The CEO in its simplest form was a "Capability Plan" prescribing what *as noted to AMB 1-42 which were?* should be done to achieve the objective with forces already committed to production. (S:251) While the Casablanca Directive did much to clarify confusion about the Objective, "it did not completely clear the air." (S:251) While initially simple with respect to phasing and targets, the plans were seriously out of phase with the intended timing with a resulting delay in attainment of the overall objective. (S:258)

*YOU COVER ALL NINE POTWAL WHICH  
IS MINIMAL BUT ALL LACK DEPTH!*

## SECTION VI

### SUMMARY AND STRATEGIC/DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS

#### Summary

That the planners of the 1942-1945 Anglo-American Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) during World War II selected a strategy of methodical bombing of Germany on an enormous scale is an uncontroverted fact of history. However, whether that strategy was selected merely to weaken Germany so as to ensure the success of OVERLORD, the great cross-Channel attack in 1944, or to bring about the total destruction of the whole military, industrial and economic system, as well as the morale of the German people is yet today the subject of some interpretation. The Casablanca Directive, stating, among other things the objectives of the campaign, was subject to differing interpretations when it was written, and it remains so today. Thus, the reason the strategy was selected for this campaign and whether the CBO was successful depends upon one's view of the purpose stated in the Casablanca Directive. *WHAT IS YOUR VIEW? THIS SOUNDS LIKE A POLITICIAN'S POSITION!*

*WHOLE POINT OF THIS PAPER IS FOR YOU TO TAKE A STAND AND DEFEND IT WITH YOUR REASON!*  
Did the CBO itself bring about overwhelming defeat of Germany? Although the writings of both Generals Hansell and Spaatz reflect the view that Allied air power was decisive in the war in Western Europe, modern historians have reached divergent conclusions about not only the CBO, but also air power in general, and the overall impact on the war. Whatever disagreement there may be regarding the 'decisiveness' of the

CBO. however. there seems to be unanimous agreement among all historical analysts that the CBO was certainly a significant factor in determining the outcome of the war in Europe. Further, ONE IS THE QUESTION WHAT IS YOUR VIEW? YOU NEVER STATED IN INTRO! if one views the objective of the CBO as making possible as invasion of the continent, it can be seen as nothing less than an overwhelming success.

Although there appears to be no real consensus as to the ultimate purpose of the CBO, THIS IS SO WISHY-WASHY! it is reasonable to conclude that the campaign strategy of sustained, massive day and night bombing of Germany by British and American heavy bombers was selected to weaken the German morale and war making ability to an extent to ensure the success of the cross-channel invasion. For the first time in the history of warfare, such a strategy was not only possible to implement, but its success could be realistically envisioned and, more importantly, attained, given relatively "strict" adherence to the principles of war as previously discussed.

#### Doctrinal Implications

Although the concept of air warfare was not entirely new--it had been around for at least 25 years--the doctrines for the application of the air arm of military power were still evolving. That evolution was shaped not only by changes in perceived growing threats to national interest, but also in large measure by increased technology. Aviation science and engineering were not so advanced in World War I to enable the production of long-

range heavy aircraft, let alone convince, or even influence, top level military leadership to begin thinking in terms of strategic bombing

By the time World War II was in full swing, however, all that had changed. The newly developed technology enabling the production of the British Lancaster and the American B-17 and B-24 and ultimately the long-range P51 escort fighter, provided the opportunity for Anglo-American political and military leaders to shift paradigms of military thinking to include strategic bombing as a viable strategy *OR NOT! (PER AMENDMENT TO DIRECTIVE)*

Although the RAF was established as an independent arm of the British military in World War II, American airmen within the Army Air Corps were still fighting for an autonomous air force. Decisive or not as to the outcome of the war in Europe, at the very least, the CBO represented the realization of the dreams of American airmen who sought to vindicate their faith in an autonomous military air arm and independent air warfare based on bombing.

Although perhaps not the primary factor, surely the success of the CBO was a significant factor in the ultimate decision in 1947 to establish the United States Air Force as an independent service, coequal with the Army and Navy within what we now know as the Department of Defense.



# BIBLIOGRAPHY

DON'T LIST

1. Bailey, Ronald H. The Air War in Europe. Alexandria, VA. Time-Life Books. 1975.
2. Bradford, Dr James C and Wayne Robinson. "World War II: Air Power in the European and Pacific Theaters.", in Air War College Nonresident Studies. Vol 1. LSN 8. 8th Ed. pp. 214-215.
3. Crowl, Philip A.. "The Strategist's Short Catechism: Six Questions Without Answers." The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History. No. 20. October 6. 1977, pp 1-14. in Air War College Nonresident Studies. Vol. 1. LSN 5. 8th Ed. pp. 23-29.
4. Futrell, Robert Frank. "AWPD-1: Air Planning for War," Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960. Vol 1. Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base AL, 1985. pp. 105-114. 123, in Air War College Nonresident Studies. Vol 1. LSN 7. 8th Ed.. pp. 209-213.
5. Futrell, Robert Frank. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1964. Air University. Maxwell Air Force Base. AL. 1980.
6. Greenfield, Kent Roberts. American Strategy in World War II: A Reconsideration. Malabar FL. Krieger Publishing Company. 1963.
7. Greenfield, Meg. "Childhood. Tempered by Anxiety." The Washington Post. July 26. 1995. pp H4-H5.
8. Grigg, John. 1942: The Victory that Never Was. New York NY. Hill and Wang. 1980.
9. Hansell, Maj. Gen Haywood S., Jr., USAF, Ret, "The Plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO)," The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler. Chapter VIII, XI. XII, pp. 157-171, 251-275. 277-278. in Air War College Nonresident Studies. Vol. 1. LSN 8. 8th Ed., pp. 251-273.
10. Hoyle. Martha Byrd. A World in Flames: The History of World War II. New York NY. Athenseum. 1970
11. Johnson, Haynes, "The New Face of the United States: What It Meant for America." The Washington Post. July 26. 1995, pp. H6-H7

12. Macksey, Kenneth. Military Strategy of World War Two. Dorset.  
Great Britain. Arms and Armour Press Limited. 1987

13. Morrison, Wilbur H. . Homes Without a Roof. New York NY.  
St. Martin's Press. 1962

14. Overy, R. J. . The Air War 1939-1945. Chelms. MI.  
Scarborough House. 1991

15. Paret, Peter. ed. , The Makers of Modern Strategy. From  
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton. Princeton University  
Press. 1986.

16. Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in  
World War II, New York. Oxford University Press. 1989

17. Sherry, Michael S. . The Rise of American Air Power: The  
Creation of Armageddon. New Haven. Yale University Press. 1987

18. Smith, J.V. . 'The Leaders of World War II: Men Who Made Over  
the World.' The Washington Post. July 26. 1995. pp. H12-H13.

19. Spahn, Gen Donn A. USAF. 'Strategic Air Power: Fulfillment  
of a Concept.' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 6, April 1946, pp  
389-396, Council on Foreign Relations, 1946. In Air War College  
Memorandum Studies. Vol. I. LSN 6. 6th Ed. . pp. 274-280.

20. Starny, Gen Donn A. . USA. 'The Principles of War,' Military  
Review, Vol. 51, No. 9, September 1931, pp. 2-12. Published by  
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Fort  
Leavenworth, KS. In Air War College Memorandum Studies. Vol. I.  
LSN 6. 6th Ed. . pp. 123-129

21. Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War: A History of  
United States Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington. Indiana  
University Press. 1977